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ABSTRACT
Access control system is an important component to protect patients’ information from abuse in a health care system. It 
is a major concern in the management, design, and development of healthcare systems. Designing access control policies 
for healthcare systems is complicated due to the dynamic and inherent complexity of the tasks performed by the healthcare 
personnel. Permissions in access control systems are usually granted on the basis of static policies. However, static 
policies are not enough to cope with various situations such as emergencies. Most often, the Break-the-glass mechanism is 
used to bypass static policies to handle emergency situations. Since healthcare systems are critical systems, where errors 
can be very costly in terms of lives, quality of life, and/or dollars, it is crucial to identify discrepancies between policy 
specifications and their intended function to implement correctly a flexible access control system. Formal verifications 
are necessary for exhaustive verification and validation of policy specifications to ensure that the policy specifications 
truly encapsulate the desires of the policy authors. We present a verifiable framework to enact a dynamic access control 
model by integrating the ANSI/INCTIS RBAC Reference Model in a workflow and an approach for property verifications of 
the access control model. Access control policies are expressed by the formal semantics of a model checker and properties 
are verified by the DiVinE model checker. 
Keywords: Model Checking; Formal Verifications; Access Control.
INTRODUCTION
An access control system regulates the operations that can 
be executed on the data and resources to be protected. The 
essence of access control is in determining what access 
privileges a given user can exercise in a given context. 
Access control decisions are driven by access control 
policy. Popular access control models include the Chinese 
Wall Access model, discretionary access control (DAC), 
mandatory access control (MAC), and role-based access 
control. Role-based access control (RBAC) is a preferred 
model implemented in healthcare systems. The American 
National Standard Institute (ANSI) and the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed the standard 
RBAC Reference Model (ANSI 2004). Canada Health Infoway 
also developed a conceptual model for access control using 
RBAC (Infoway 2005). 
The RBAC model is usually inflexible in making decisions 
and provides only two output decisions: grant or deny. The 
main drawback of the RBAC model is failing to provide the 
flexibility required to deal with emergency situations which 
are typical in healthcare applications. The Break-the-glass 
concept is an approach to granting emergency access to 
healthcare systems to overcome this problem (SPC 2004). 
Most existing implementations use break-the-glass as an 
exception-handling mechanism. The Rostard (2009) study 
observed the use of the break-the-glass mechanism in 
a system in which normal access control is enforced as 
a combination of role and workplace. They found that 
exception-handling requests exceed access requests and 
concluded that static approaches to define access control 
policies do not achieve reasonable outcomes in a dynamic 
hospital setting and will not reduce the misuse of exception-
handling mechanisms. They also found that combining 
norms and practices, medical guidelines, observational 
data, and audit data to learn patterns of information used in 
healthcare and then applying these patterns to create access 
control rules will help to minimize the use of the break-the-
glass access. These resources also contain information about 
workflow in healthcare. We present a verifiable framework 
for dynamic access control model integrating with standard 
RBAC that will work as an enactment service in healthcare 
workflow. We also present an approach for verifying the 
policies of access control. 
Access control system is the critical component of an 
information systems. It is common that a system’s privacy and 
security are compromised due to the wrong configuration of 
access control policies. This problem becomes increasingly 
severe in healthcare systems because healthcare systems 
are large scale systems involving complex and distributive 
processes which are deployed to manage a huge amount 
of sensitive information and resources. Moreover, the 
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2information and resources are organized into sophisticated 
structures with a high degree of variability. Healthcare 
systems are also critical systems, where errors can be very 
costly in terms of lives, quality of life, and/or dollars. It is 
crucial to identify discrepancies between policy specifications 
and their intended function to implement correctly a flexible 
access control system. Formal verifications are necessary for 
exhaustive verification and validation of policy specifications 
to ensure that the policy specifications truly encapsulate the 
desires of the policy authors. We present a model checking 
based approach for automated verifications of access control 
policies. Access control policies are expressed by the formal 
semantics of the model checker and properties are verified 
by the model checker. 
Our contributions are twofold: first, we present a 
workflow-based access control model based on standard 
RBAC for healthcare systems with an exception handling 
mechanism. Second, we present formal verifications for 
security analysis of the access control policies. We used 
the distributed and high performance model checker 
DiVinE (Verstoep et al., 2009; Barnat et al., 2009) to verify 
the access control policies of our proposed model for a 
healthcare workflow. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow: 
firstly, we present background information; then we 
introduce the core RBAC reference model and our proposed 
workflow-based access control model. Thirdly, we present 
a brief discussion of how the proposed model. Finally, 
properties are specified and verified by the model checker 
and related works are presented. 
PRELIMINERIES
CORE RBAC
Role Base Access Control (RBAC) is the state-of-the-art 
access control model proposed in (Sandhu 1996). In this 
section, we present the ANSI/INCITS core RBAC model. 
The Core RBAC Reference Model defines the set of basic 
elements: users, roles, operations, sessions, permissions, and 
objects. It consists of the following relations: 
1. User-Assignment: UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, a many to many 
mapping user-to-role assignment. 
2. Permission-Assignment: PA ⊆ PRMS × ROLES, a many 
to many mapping permission-to-role assignment. PRMS 
= 2(OPS×OBS), the set of permissions. 
3. The set of operations associated with permission p is 
Op(p ∈ PRMS) →{op ∈ OPS}. 
4. The set of objects associated with permission p is Ob (p 
∈ PRMS) →{ob ∈ OBS}. 
5. SESSIONS is the set of sessions. User-Session: US (s ∈ 
SESSIONS) → USERS, the mapping of user u onto a set 
of sessions. Session-Roles: SR(s ∈ SESSIONS) → 2ROLES, 
the mapping of session s onto set of roles.
The core RBAC model makes authorization the 
decisions grant/deny by taking user information, intended 
operations, and the target object as inputs. It can be expressed 
as follows:follows:  
!"#$%&'(!!"#$"! ! "#! ! "# ! !!"#$%!!"#$!   
The core RBAC module identifies the role r for the user 
u then check the permissions for role r to perform operations 
Ops on object obj. 
MODEL CHECKINg
Model checking is an automated technique that, given a finite-
state model of a system and a logical property, systematically 
checks that this property holds for a given initial state in that 
model (Clarke 1986). Model checking requires an exhaustive 
search through all possible configurations, or states, of a 
system. We use liner temporal logic (LTL) to specify the 
properties of our access control model. Temporal logic is a 
formalism for describing sequences of transitions between 
states in a reactive system like workflow. In temporal logic, 
time is not specified explicitly; instead, temporal operators 
are used to specify properties such as: eventually some 
designated states are reached, or an error state is never 
reached. LTL is a temporal logic, with connectives that 
allow us to refer to the future. It models time as a sequence 
of states, extending infinitely into the future. LTL formulas 
are built from predicates, logical connectives, universal and 
existential quantifiers, and modalities G (globally in the 
future), F (eventually in the future), X (in the next step) and 
U (until). 
We use automata-based model checking (Kupferman 
2000) to verify access control policies. In automata-based 
model checking, the modeled system is converted into 
a corresponding Buchi automaton and the negation of 
property specification to be checked is converted into another 
automaton which is known as never-claim automaton. Then, 
the emptiness of the intersection of the system and the negated 
specification automaton is checked. If the system holds the 
property then the intersection is empty. If the intersection is 
not empty, a counter example is reported. 
DIVINE MODEL CHECKER
DiVinE is a distributed and high performance explicit-state 
model checker that follows the automata-based approach. 
It has several platform dependent versions such as the 
FIgURE 1. The core RBAC model
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3distributed-memory DiVinE Cluster (Barnat et al. 2005), 
and the shared-memory DiVinE Multi core (Barnat et al. 
2008). DiVinE offers model checking of finite state systems 
against specification formulated in LTL. 
State-space explosion is the main concern of the 
model checking. DiVinE utilizes high performance cluster 
computing to overcome this problem. Due to the looping and 
inherent complexity of workflow, we use DiVinE to verify 
WfAC module integrated with workflow. The finite state 
machine (FSM) specifications of Workflow-based Access 
Control Model (WfACM) are translated into DVE , the formal 
semantics of DiVinE that use the standard notation of the 
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) (Hoare, 1983). 
Therefore, it can be translated into the formal semantics of 
any classical finite-state model checker such as SPIN. 
PROPOSED MODEL
  WORKFLOW-BASED ACCESS CONTROL MODULE
We propose the Workflow-based Access Control Model 
(WfACM) as a part of a workflow engine to enact access 
control policy. The WfACM enforces the dynamic access 
policies which vary some process to process. WfACM 
is interfaced with standard ANSI/INCITS RBAC with 
modifications for exception-handling and reducing misuse. 
WfACM is shown in Figure 1.
The Workflow-based Access Control model first checks 
the mode of operations. There are two possible modes: normal 
mode and emergency/exception-handling mode. If normal 
mode is selected, it invokes core RBAC module which is part 
of the main model in which core RBAC is implemented. In case 
of emergency/exception-handling modes, it performs some 
additional tasks that include: re-validating user credentials, 
triggering for audit logging, asking user to provide reasons 
for using emergency mode, and  notifying the resource owner; 
and finally, changing user role. An exception-handling role is 
assigned to the current user. This role is not a flat exception-
handling role; it varies from process to process and grants the 
least privileges i.e., necessary permissions to complete the 
assigned task. The standard RBAC procedure is then invoked 
with following arguments: user, temporarily assigned role, 
operations and objects. 
The workflow-based access control model makes 
authorization decisions by taking all the information 
necessary for core RBAC module with additional mode 
information as input. It provides grant decision if the user 
is adequate to perform the actions on the targeted object in 
the current mode, or deny if access is not granted. It can be 
expressed as follows: 
!"#$!!"#$! ! "#$"! ! "#!! "#! ! !!"#$%!!"#$! 
The WfAC module identifies the role r for the user u 
then checks the permissions for role r to perform operations 
Ops on object obj for the specified mode. 
FINITE STATE MACHINES (FSMS) SPECIFICATION OF WFACM
Dynamic constraints that regulate the access permissions 
in the workflow can be specified with asynchronous 
specification expressions of FSM. Hu et al. (2008) developed a 
FSM specification to model the generic access control policies 
for verifications. They specified an authorization process for 
a user with four states: idle, entering, critical, and exiting for 
a particular dynamic constraint.
A user is normally in the idle state. He will move to the 
entering state when he wants to access the critical object. If 
it is in the access limit, he will move to the critical state, and 
the number of the current access is increased by 1. When the 
user finishes accessing the critical object, he will return back 
to the exiting state, and the number of the current access is 
decreased by 1. The user is then move from the exiting state 
to the idle state again. We use the similar specifications with 
the extensions for exceptions handling.  
FIgURE 2. Workflow-based Access Control Model
We introduce a mode variable to enforce different 
access policies. In normal mode, it follows the similar RBAC 
reference model and in emergency mode, it performs the tasks 
recommended for exceptions handling. In our framework, 
ALgORITHM 1. FSM Specifications
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4we convert this FSM specification into a Kripke Structure 
and translate the Kripke Structure into the formal semantics 
of model checker. The FSM specifications for WfACM 
are given in Algorithm 1 and its procedure is shown in 
Procedure 1. 
MODELINg WFACM WITH DICINE
The workflow access control properties to be verified are 
specified in LTL. Then we translate the Kripke structure 
and LTL property into DVE language. DVE specification and 
defined properties are similar to finite state automata. Each 
automaton is translated as a process in DVE and processes 
interact through channels. Process can read from (designated 
by ”?”) or write to (designated by  ”!”) channels. We use the 
same mapping relations defined in RBAC reference model. 
Numerical values are assigned to each entity of USERS, 
PRMS, OBS, OPS for unique identifications. Roles: Manager 
= 0, CareNavigator = 1, CaseManager = 2, Pharmacist = 3, 
SocialWorker = 4, SystemNavigator = 5, Users: MacIsac = 
0, Kmiller = 1 etc. Ops: Read = 1,Write = 2. Obs: PatientInfo 
= 0. PrescribedDrug∕Therapy = 1. ExtraSensitiveInfo = 2. 
Prms: grant = 1, Deny = 0. 
Two-dimensional mapping relations are represented 
by one dimensional variable because DiVinE does not 
support multidimensional array variable. A vector variable 
UA′ is used to represent many to many mapping user-to-role 
assignment UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES. The first index of UA′ 
indicates the user information then followed by the Boolean 
information of all roles. If a user is assigned to a role then its 
value is 1 otherwise 0. In similar way, all users’ information 
is stored linearly. For example, if USERS = 2, ROLE = 3, then 
UA [8] = {u1, r1, r2, r3, u2, r1, r2, r3}. 
Another vector variable PA′ is used to represent many 
to many mapping permission-to-role assignment PA ⊆ 
PRMS × ROLES. The first index of PA′ indicates the object 
followed by the role information followed by the access 
rights information. For example, if OBJECTS = 3, ROLE = 3, 
then PA[30] = {obj1, r1, R, W, r2, R, W, r3, R, W, obj2, r1, R, 
W, r2, R, W,  r3, R, W, obj3,  r1, R, W, r2,  R, W, r3, R, W}. 
R/W stands for Boolean read/write permissions. 
There are five processes for WfACM: checkaccess, 
normal Mode Operation, emergency Mode Operation, 
check-Permission, and decisions. The CheckAccess process 
is invoked by any other processes in workflow that needs 
to use access control service. It accepts user information, 
objects information and actions intended to perform. Then 
it also considers the mode of operations whether it is normal 
mode or emergency / exception handling mode. The DVE 
code for the Check Access process is given in Figure 3. 
AC POLICIES VERIFICATIONS
We outlined the workflow access control model in DVE 
language. In this section, we will show how access control 
policies for healthcare systems can be checked by DiVinE. 
Li and Tripunitara (2006) introduced a family of security 
analysis problems in RBAC. We only verified the restrictions 
property. In a healthcare system, a restriction property can 
be formulate as: Does a pharmacist have the access to 
the patient personal information? In our workflow, a user 
whose role is pharmacist doses not have the access to the 
patient information but in emergency, the pharmacist may 
need to know a patient’s allergy information to execute 
prescribed drug or therapy. If we check the property for 
pharmacist p,  and it returns accepting cycle then we can 
check the property   which will return no accepting cycle. 
Verifications result is shown in Table 1.
RELATED WORK
Research on the rise is to design dynamic access control 
model with exception handling features for healthcare 
system. RBAC model is a widely-accepted access control 
model, but due to rigidness in making decisions, it is not 
suitable for healthcare systems. To overcome this problem, 
numerous methodologies are proposed. Povey introduced 
the idea of optimistic security in (Povey, 1999) which is a 
rollback concept in case of misuse and information from 
the audit logs are traces to identify the misuse. They claim 
that this idea is suitable for healthcare system to compensate 
misuse. Optimistic security exists in many healthcare 
systems as a break-the-glass mechanism which is intended 
to be used in emergency situations.
Russello et al. argues that such  property does not 
always hold. In many situations, all information is not 
recoverable such as the disclosed confidentiality of the 
patient (Russello et al. 2008). Etalle and Winsborough 
(2007) presented Posteriori compliance control which 
delays the access control after gaining access decisions by 
providing an infrastructure which allows securely auditing 
and rolling back in case of a denied access, focusing on risks 
of not granting privileges. We used the notion of workflow 
to specify and implement the fine-grained access control 
policies.
In workflow, specific tasks are assigned to the 
designated entities and this feature will help to reduce the 
misuse of the exception handling mechanisms. A framework 
is proposed in (Russello et al. 2008) where access rights are 
provided to entities on the basis of the actual task so that 
the assigned tasks must be fulfilled by the entities as a part 
of their duties. For capturing the requirements of entities’ 
duties, the notion of workflow is used. They argued that 
RBAC is not flexible enough for coping with the dynamic 
working environment. They used YAWL for specifying 
workflow which is similar to our approach. However, they 
proposed a new policy based access control module using 
Ponder2 policy language and interpreter developed at 
Imperial College London (Twidle et al. 2009). But we are 
motivated to use standard RBAC model due to its broadly 
recognition.  Ferreira et al. (2009) proposed a framework 
that integrates break-the-glass mechanism within the NIST/
ANSI RBAC model to adopt generically in any domain 
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5finite state specifications. They used the well-known SMV 
model checker to verify access control policies specified 
in computation tree logic (CTL). There are other model 
checking based verifications approach for verifying access 
control policy such as (Zhang et al. 2008). They modeled 
rule-based policies in their Read/Write (RW) language based 
on propositional logic and conduct model checking on 
the policies. However, our approach is specifically in the 
context of workflows. The RW language is not primarily 
designed towards such needs. 
Schaad et al. (2006) used model checking techniques 
for automated analysis of revocation and delegation 
functionalities in organizational workflow. They used the 
symbolic model checker NuSMV (Cimatti et al. 2002) to 
verify the properties specified in liner temporal logic (LTL).
We use an automata-based distributed and parallel model 
checker to verify the access control policies integrated with 
workflow.
PROCEDURE 1. WfAC(access-limit)
where unanticipated or emergency situations may occur. 
The model provides a third decision option break the glass 
along with two decisions by RBAC. However, they proposed 
a new model apart from the standard model for exception 
handling. 
Due to the complexity and importance of access 
control models, formal methods have been applied to 
verify the required properties. Vincent et al. [13] provides 
a method for specifying generic access control policies by 
FIgURE 3. checkAccess Process
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a Workflow-based Access 
Control Model that incorporates the standard RBAC with 
exception handling mechanism which is especially suitable 
for healthcare system. Our model suggests the dynamic 
FIgURE 4. identifyRole Process
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6access control policies will be extracted from the sources 
of information necessary to develop the workflow and 
therefore, the medical guidelines, best practices and 
observational information will be used to design and verify 
the access control policies. In this paper, we have not 
considered the role hierarchy. 
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